Ridgeline Certification

RCIR study guide

Ridgeline Certified Incident Response Specialist (RCIR)
Exam objectives, RCIR-01

Published November 16, 2026. 60 questions in 2 hours 30 minutes; passing score 70%. Every scored question maps to one objective below. To keep a copy, print this page or save it as a PDF from your browser.

A. Readiness 10%

IR plans against SP 800-61r3, decision rights, tabletop findings, logging coverage and retention, and out-of-band communication.

  1. A1 Find the gaps in a plan and its decision rights
    • Determine who decides each call and where a plan leaves a decision without an owner
    • Evaluate a plan, a retainer and a communication channel against the incident they must survive
    • Interpret what moving to SP 800-61 Rev. 3 asks of governance
  2. A2 Judge logging coverage and retention
    • Rank logging gaps against current intrusions and dwell times
    • Identify what an audit tier, an inventory gap or a log kept on the device itself leaves unseen
  3. A3 Design exercises and learn from them
    • Select the inject that tests an exercise objective
    • Rank exercise findings by what each would stop

B. Triage and validation 11.7%

Telling real from benign, setting severity, and the first-hour calls, from sign-ins, alerts, tickets and appliance logs.

  1. B1 Decide whether an alert is a real incident
    • Separate a true positive from a benign explanation using the fields in the evidence
    • Weigh several weak signals together, and recognize when a trusted actor's change is still the finding
  2. B2 Set severity and the initial scope
    • Determine how serious an event is from what it reached and who holds what
    • Recognize when an event widens the incident beyond the system that alerted
  3. B3 Make the first-hour calls
    • Select the first action when credentials, sessions or devices are exposed
    • Test a common cause before working a surge of alerts one by one

C. Scoping and investigation 25%

Initial access, the true start, attribution of events between actors, and the reach of an intrusion across identity, endpoint, cloud, network and memory.

  1. C1 Establish initial access and the true start
    • Place the start of an intrusion from the evidence rather than the first alert
    • Recognize when a record does not reach back far enough to show the start
  2. C2 Attribute activity and reconstruct the sequence
    • Separate one actor's activity from another's, or from legitimate use of the same identity
    • Date and order events using one source to fix another
  3. C3 Determine the reach of an intrusion
    • Scope accounts, hosts, data, backups and third-party paths across identity, endpoint, cloud and network
    • Identify exposed credentials and what each one opens
  4. C4 Interpret what each record establishes and cannot show
    • Hold each conclusion to what its record shows, including memory analysis and EDR output
    • Recognize silence that is an absence of data rather than evidence of absence

D. Evidence and preservation 11.7%

Order of volatility, collection that does not destroy, integrity and custody, retention against the clock, and legal holds.

  1. D1 Collect evidence in order of volatility
    • Order collection by what will be lost first, including what a platform deletes for you
    • Isolate and collect without destroying the evidence or the host
  2. D2 Keep evidence defensible
    • Interpret hashes, custody records and time zones correctly
    • Write and record collections so that they stand up to challenge
  3. D3 Preserve against retention and legal holds
    • Determine which sources still hold the period in question and what to export first
    • Turn a legal hold into what each system can actually do, and state the gaps

E. Containment and eradication 18.3%

Containment order, cutting every way back in at once, session and token revocation, business constraints, and avoiding tip-off.

  1. E1 Identify every way back in
    • List the credentials, sessions, grants, roles and functions an attacker holds
    • Determine what each containment step does and does not end
  2. E2 Plan containment order and timing
    • Contain within business constraints without avoidable outages
    • Act in one coordinated change when the attacker can watch or rebuild
  3. E3 Verify containment and what it leaves unknown
    • Check from the evidence that a containment step worked
    • State what deleted or missing records leave unknown

F. Recovery and post-incident 11.7%

Rebuild against clean, recovery order, credential resets after domain compromise, root cause, post-incident actions and closure criteria.

  1. F1 Decide how to recover
    • Decide what to rebuild rather than clean, and what to keep before a system returns to service
    • Set the recovery order from dependencies and the state of credentials
  2. F2 Establish eradication and closure
    • Recognize incomplete eradication and its cause
    • Set closure criteria, including credential resets and monitoring, that can be tested
  3. F3 Find the root cause and improve
    • Write a root cause that names a control rather than a person
    • Measure the incident consistently and write actions that will be done

G. Coordination and communication 11.7%

Executives, regulators (NIS2, GDPR), customers, suppliers, insurers, law enforcement and the press: what to say, to whom, by when.

  1. G1 Meet notification duties
    • Determine when NIS2 and GDPR deadlines run and what each notice needs
    • Separate the duties of a controller and a processor
  2. G2 Communicate with executives, staff, customers and the press
    • Select statements that say only what is established
    • Lead a briefing with the decisions it needs, and support staff who are targeted
  3. G3 Work with suppliers, providers, insurers and law enforcement
    • Use a contract and an insurance policy to get what the response needs
    • Weigh a third party's statement against your own records