Ridgeline Certified Incident Response Specialist (RCIR)
Exam objectives, RCIR-01
Published November 16, 2026. 60 questions in 2 hours 30 minutes; passing score 70%. Every scored question maps to one objective below. To keep a copy, print this page or save it as a PDF from your browser.
A. Readiness 10%
IR plans against SP 800-61r3, decision rights, tabletop findings, logging coverage and retention, and out-of-band communication.
- A1 Find the gaps in a plan and its decision rights
- Determine who decides each call and where a plan leaves a decision without an owner
- Evaluate a plan, a retainer and a communication channel against the incident they must survive
- Interpret what moving to SP 800-61 Rev. 3 asks of governance
- A2 Judge logging coverage and retention
- Rank logging gaps against current intrusions and dwell times
- Identify what an audit tier, an inventory gap or a log kept on the device itself leaves unseen
- A3 Design exercises and learn from them
- Select the inject that tests an exercise objective
- Rank exercise findings by what each would stop
B. Triage and validation 11.7%
Telling real from benign, setting severity, and the first-hour calls, from sign-ins, alerts, tickets and appliance logs.
- B1 Decide whether an alert is a real incident
- Separate a true positive from a benign explanation using the fields in the evidence
- Weigh several weak signals together, and recognize when a trusted actor's change is still the finding
- B2 Set severity and the initial scope
- Determine how serious an event is from what it reached and who holds what
- Recognize when an event widens the incident beyond the system that alerted
- B3 Make the first-hour calls
- Select the first action when credentials, sessions or devices are exposed
- Test a common cause before working a surge of alerts one by one
C. Scoping and investigation 25%
Initial access, the true start, attribution of events between actors, and the reach of an intrusion across identity, endpoint, cloud, network and memory.
- C1 Establish initial access and the true start
- Place the start of an intrusion from the evidence rather than the first alert
- Recognize when a record does not reach back far enough to show the start
- C2 Attribute activity and reconstruct the sequence
- Separate one actor's activity from another's, or from legitimate use of the same identity
- Date and order events using one source to fix another
- C3 Determine the reach of an intrusion
- Scope accounts, hosts, data, backups and third-party paths across identity, endpoint, cloud and network
- Identify exposed credentials and what each one opens
- C4 Interpret what each record establishes and cannot show
- Hold each conclusion to what its record shows, including memory analysis and EDR output
- Recognize silence that is an absence of data rather than evidence of absence
D. Evidence and preservation 11.7%
Order of volatility, collection that does not destroy, integrity and custody, retention against the clock, and legal holds.
- D1 Collect evidence in order of volatility
- Order collection by what will be lost first, including what a platform deletes for you
- Isolate and collect without destroying the evidence or the host
- D2 Keep evidence defensible
- Interpret hashes, custody records and time zones correctly
- Write and record collections so that they stand up to challenge
- D3 Preserve against retention and legal holds
- Determine which sources still hold the period in question and what to export first
- Turn a legal hold into what each system can actually do, and state the gaps
E. Containment and eradication 18.3%
Containment order, cutting every way back in at once, session and token revocation, business constraints, and avoiding tip-off.
- E1 Identify every way back in
- List the credentials, sessions, grants, roles and functions an attacker holds
- Determine what each containment step does and does not end
- E2 Plan containment order and timing
- Contain within business constraints without avoidable outages
- Act in one coordinated change when the attacker can watch or rebuild
- E3 Verify containment and what it leaves unknown
- Check from the evidence that a containment step worked
- State what deleted or missing records leave unknown
F. Recovery and post-incident 11.7%
Rebuild against clean, recovery order, credential resets after domain compromise, root cause, post-incident actions and closure criteria.
- F1 Decide how to recover
- Decide what to rebuild rather than clean, and what to keep before a system returns to service
- Set the recovery order from dependencies and the state of credentials
- F2 Establish eradication and closure
- Recognize incomplete eradication and its cause
- Set closure criteria, including credential resets and monitoring, that can be tested
- F3 Find the root cause and improve
- Write a root cause that names a control rather than a person
- Measure the incident consistently and write actions that will be done
G. Coordination and communication 11.7%
Executives, regulators (NIS2, GDPR), customers, suppliers, insurers, law enforcement and the press: what to say, to whom, by when.
- G1 Meet notification duties
- Determine when NIS2 and GDPR deadlines run and what each notice needs
- Separate the duties of a controller and a processor
- G2 Communicate with executives, staff, customers and the press
- Select statements that say only what is established
- Lead a briefing with the decisions it needs, and support staff who are targeted
- G3 Work with suppliers, providers, insurers and law enforcement
- Use a contract and an insurance policy to get what the response needs
- Weigh a third party's statement against your own records