Ridgeline Certified Endpoint Forensic Specialist (RCEF)
Exam objectives, RCEF-01
Published November 16, 2026. 60 questions in 2 hours 30 minutes; passing score 70%. Every scored question maps to one objective below. To keep a copy, print this page or save it as a PDF from your browser.
A. Initial access 13.3%
Lures (LNK, ISO, HTA), ClickFix, fake installers, user overrides of platform checks, exploited edge devices and web shells.
- A1 Establish how attacker code first ran
- Find the first malicious process and the action that started it, among the user's ordinary activity
- Read lures, installers and platform overrides for what they ran
- A2 Follow initial access to what it gave the attacker
- Recognize exploited services and web shells from their traces
- Trace what a first foothold took or opened, across host and identity records
- A3 State the consequences of initial access
- Separate the host decision from the incident's real scope
- Name what the records cannot yet show about what was reached
B. Execution and evasion 20%
Encoded PowerShell, built-in tools in attacker hands, Defender exclusions, vulnerable-driver EDR killers, cleared logs, timestomping, and mobile permission abuse.
- B1 Recognize attacker execution
- Read encoded scripts, built-in tools and installed apps for what they ran
- Tell an attacker's use of a tool from its normal use by its parent, account and arguments
- B2 Recognize evasion
- Identify exclusions, vulnerable-driver EDR killers, cleared logs, timestomping and hidden apps
- Fill a gap in one record from the host's other records
- B3 Draw findings from execution evidence
- Read a logon or a permission against its own baseline
- State what an execution record proves about data, people and second factors
C. Persistence 15%
Scheduled tasks, services, WMI, Run keys, COM hijacks and accessibility backdoors; launchd; cron, systemd and SSH keys; ESXi startup scripts; web shells; Kubernetes workloads.
- C1 Find planted persistence on Windows
- Pick planted tasks, services, WMI subscriptions and COM entries from genuine ones
- Recognize accessibility and registry-stored backdoors
- C2 Find planted persistence beyond Windows
- Recognize cron, systemd, SSH key, launchd, web shell, ESXi and Kubernetes persistence
- Judge an entry by its path, signer, date and action rather than its name
- C3 Decide what persistence means for recovery
- Place persistence in time and apply it to backups and rebuilds
- State what the attacker could do while the persistence stood
D. Credential access 15%
LSASS dumps, saved hives and NTDS.dit, browser and keychain theft, Kerberoasting, AS-REP roasting, DCSync, exported tickets and cloud credentials.
- D1 Recognize credential theft from its traces
- Recognize LSASS dumps, saved hives, directory database copies, keychain and browser theft
- Recognize roasting, replication and cloud credential harvesting
- D2 Determine what a credential theft exposed
- List the accounts and secrets a theft exposed, including ones no longer signed in
- State what each stolen credential lets an attacker do, and act on exposure when use cannot be shown
E. Lateral movement and remote access 13.3%
PsExec and Impacket traces, WinRM, DCOM, RDP and tunnels, SSH pivots, and remote support tools the company does not use.
- E1 Recognize lateral movement
- Identify Impacket, WinRM, DCOM, SSH and tunneled RDP traces
- Separate an attack tool's movement from an administrator's use of the same mechanism
- E2 Recognize remote access an attacker installed
- Tell the company's remote tools from the same tools pointed elsewhere
- Read a remote tool's own configuration and logs for unattended access
- E3 Trace the source and what access survives
- Trace movement to its source against the account's baseline
- Determine what a reset, a revocation or an isolation does and does not end
F. Collection, exfiltration and impact 13.3%
Archive staging, rclone and cloud uploads, shadow copy and backup destruction, hypervisor encryption, and ransom note claims.
- F1 Recognize staging and exfiltration
- Recognize archive staging, cloud sync tools, dumps in memory and uploads to storage the company does not own
- Read a command for its direction, destination and filters
- F2 Recognize destruction and the removal of recovery
- Identify snapshot, shadow copy and backup destruction before encryption
- Locate where encryption ran from the records of the hosts it reached
- F3 Bound impact and weigh claims
- Bound what left from the records, against an attacker's claims
- Follow impact beyond the host, through published packages, partners and stolen secrets
G. Findings 10%
Attacker against administrator, tool against operator, sequence, and findings stated at the strength of the evidence.
- G1 Separate attacker from administrator, and tool from operator
- Recognize machine-paced activity and genuine alerts from lures
- Attribute activity to an operator by source, target and scope, not by a tool's artifacts
- G2 State findings at the strength of the evidence
- Write statements that say what is proved and what cannot be known
- Distinguish consistency from proof in a sequence of events
- G3 Turn findings into action
- Decide what ends an attacker's access, from the findings
- Recommend actions for people and devices that remain targets