Ridgeline Certification

RCIR ยท Sample case study

Ridgeline Certified Incident Response Specialist

One complete case study, written the way the RCIR exam writes them, with the answers and the reasoning behind each option.

About this sample

A practice case written for this page. It is not in the exam and is not scored.

In the exam, each case study opens with a brief about the organization and your role, then gives you exhibits: logs, audit events, timelines, tickets and notices. The questions ask what you would conclude or do. The values in the exhibits below agree with one another, as they do in the exam's cases. Like an exam case, this sample has 3 questions.

Work each question from the exhibits before opening the answer. The explanation covers every option, because knowing why a plausible option is wrong is most of what the exam measures.

The invoice that changed banks

You are the incident response lead at Tolland Plastics. Read the brief tabs first.

Overview

Tolland Plastics makes injection-molded parts, with about 400 staff. IT and security are a team of six. You lead incident response.

Environment

Cloud mail with MFA by phone approval. Accounts payable pays suppliers by bank transfer on the details held in the finance system, which ap.lewis (Dana Lewis) updates on a supplier's written request.

The mail audit records rules, and which items are read or synced and from where.

Current situation

At 08:55 on 4 May, Harbrook Metals called: its invoice HM-20931 for $184,250 is unpaid, and it has never changed its bank details. Tolland paid HM-20931 yesterday to a new account. Security pulled Exhibits 1 to 3.

Requirements and constraints

R1. The CFO wants the money back if it can be.

R2. Dana is in the office and can be reached.

Exhibits

Exhibit 1. Sign-ins for ap.lewis (UTC)
timeIPnetworkclientauthentication
2027-04-26 08:47203.0.113.20officeOutlook desktoppassword + MFA
2027-04-28 22:13198.51.100.73hosting providerbrowserpassword + MFA (approved on phone 22:13)
2027-04-29 08:51203.0.113.20officeOutlook desktoppassword + MFA
2027-04-30 07:02198.51.100.73hosting providerbrowser (session from 28 April)none, session reused
2027-05-03 06:55198.51.100.73hosting providerbrowser (session from 28 April)none, session reused
2027-05-04 08:49203.0.113.20officeOutlook desktoppassword + MFA
Exhibit 2. Mailbox audit
Mailbox audit, ap.lewis@tolland.com
2027-04-28 22:19  New-InboxRule  client 198.51.100.73
  Name: "."   Condition: from address contains "harbrookmetals.com"   Action: move to "RSS Subscriptions", mark as read
2027-04-28 22:24  MailItemsAccessed  client 198.51.100.73  folders: Inbox, Sent Items, Archive  (bind, 1,812 items)
2027-04-30 07:05  MailItemsAccessed  client 198.51.100.73  folders: Inbox  (sync)
Exhibit 3. Message trace, invoice HM-20931
timefromtosubjectresult
2027-04-22 14:10accounts@harbrookmetals.comap.lewis@tolland.comInvoice HM-20931, $184,250, due 5 Maydelivered, Inbox
2027-04-30 07:11accounts@harbrookrnetals.comap.lewis@tolland.comRE: Invoice HM-20931 - updated bank detailsdelivered, Inbox (SPF pass for the sending domain)
2027-05-02 10:30accounts@harbrookmetals.comap.lewis@tolland.comPayment reminder HM-20931 - please do not change our bank detailsdelivered, moved by rule to RSS Subscriptions
2027-05-03 15:42payments@tolland.comaccounts@harbrookmetals.comRemittance advice HM-20931 (new account)delivered

Questions

Question 1

The supplier says it never changed its bank details. Where is the compromise?

  1. AIn the supplier's mailbox: the bank change email passed SPF, which shows it came from the supplier's own mail system, so Tolland's systems are not involved.
  2. BNowhere in Tolland or the supplier: a fraudster registered harbrookrnetals.com and emailed accounts payable, which needs no access to either company's mail.
  3. CIn Tolland's own mailbox: ap.lewis was signed in from 198.51.100.73, a rule hides the real supplier's mail, and the bank change came from the look-alike harbrookrnetals.com.
  4. DIn the supplier's mailbox, which explains how the fraudster knew the invoice number and amount; the inbox rule at Tolland is an unrelated filing rule.
Show the answer

The answer is C.

  • A. SPF passed for the sending domain, harbrookrnetals.com, which is the attacker's; it says nothing about the supplier's systems.
  • B. The rule created from the attacker's address at 22:19 and the mailbox reads show access to Tolland's mailbox.
  • C. a rule created from the attacker's address moves the real supplier's mail out of sight, and the attacker read the mailbox, which is where the invoice details came from. The look-alike domain carried the bank change.
  • D. The invoice details are in Tolland's mailbox, which the attacker read; and a rule named "." that marks the supplier's mail as read, created from a hosting address, is not filing.

Question 2

What could the attacker have read?

  1. ANothing, as the attacker sent mail from a look-alike domain and never needed to open any of the messages in the mailbox.
  2. BAnything in the Inbox, Sent Items and Archive folders, 1,812 items bound on 28 April, and the Inbox as it synced on 30 April.
  3. COnly the email thread about invoice HM-20931, since that is the only thread the attacker needed in order to commit the fraud.
  4. DEvery mailbox in Tolland, as an attacker inside one mailbox can open every other mailbox in the same company tenant.
Show the answer

The answer is B.

  • A. The audit shows MailItemsAccessed from the attacker's address on 28 and 30 April.
  • B. the audit records what was accessed and from where; that is the scope for notification decisions, not the thread the fraud used.
  • C. The audit shows whole folders bound, not one thread.
  • D. Access to one mailbox does not give access to others; nothing here shows any other mailbox touched.

Question 3

It is 09:10 on 4 May, and the payment left yesterday at 15:40. What do you do first?

  1. AReset ap.lewis's password now; the bank recall can wait until the investigation has confirmed the payment was fraudulent.
  2. BReport the look-alike domain to its registrar for takedown, so that the attacker cannot send any more email from it to anyone.
  3. CDelete the inbox rule so that the real supplier's emails reach ap.lewis again, then review the rest of the mailbox audit.
  4. DHave finance ask the bank to recall the payment now, and in parallel end ap.lewis's sessions, remove the rule and reset her password and MFA.
Show the answer

The answer is D.

  • A. The supplier has already said it never changed its details; waiting costs the recall, and a reset alone leaves the reused session.
  • B. Worth doing later; it does not recover the money or remove the attacker from the mailbox.
  • C. Deleting the rule first warns the attacker and leaves their session working.
  • D. a recall's chance falls by the hour, so it starts now; the session reuse shows a password reset alone would not end the attacker's access.

Next steps

The study guide lists every skill the Ridgeline Certified Incident Response Specialist exam measures and how to prepare for it. The certification page covers the voucher and what the certification is worth.